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Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to experience both successful 
and unsuccessful software-intensive systems development, despite all of the 
considerable qualifications of the workforce and the significant controls offered by 
the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). The unsuccessful software-intensive 
systems have suffered dramatic cost and schedule overruns, impacting 
modernization timetables and reducing funding for other developmental priorities. 
This research is a continuation and consolidation of previous research 
projects conducted for the U.S. Navy Open Architecture Task Force. That previous 
research is identified and cited where appropriate. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze why DoD risk management 
processes have not been more effective in reducing software-intensive systems 
development risk. This research addresses the use of the Technical Readiness 
Assessment (TRA) using the nine-level software Technology Readiness Levels 
(TRLs), use of the software developer maturity level assessments using the 
Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI’s) Capability Maturity Model-Integrated for 
Development (CMMI-DEV), and use of the software acquirer maturity level 
assessments using SEI’s CMMI for Acquisition (CMMI-ACQ). The recommendations 
include the use of effective tools, techniques, and analyses presented in the author’s 
previous research efforts. 
The previously researched tools, techniques, and analyses include the SEI’s 
Quality Attribution Workshop (QAW), the MUIRS (maintainability, upgradability, 
interoperability, reliability, and safety/security) analysis methodology, SEI’s 
Architectural Tradeoff Analysis Methodologysm (ATAMsm), Logistics Supportability 
Analysis (LSA), and the Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA).  
The major research findings include the following: 
• The software TRLs are ineffective in reducing technical risk for the 
software component development. 
• Without the software TRLs, there is no effective method to perform 
software TRA or reduce the technical development risk. The software 
component will behave as a new, untried technology in nearly every 
software-intensive weapon system development. 
• Given that the software technical risk cannot be effectively managed, 
risk reduction is focused on reducing management risk for both the 
supplier (contractor) and the acquirer (government PM organization). 
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• Assessing organizational maturity as a risk-reducing approach, 
industry appears to be gaining excellent results through moving up the 
SEI CMMI-DEV maturity levels. There seems to be little DoD interest in 
using the SEI CMMI-ACQ for assessing or improving the PM 
organization maturity. 
The major research recommendations include the following: 
• Shift the software development risk management focus from technical 
to managerial risk reduction. 
• A nine-level software Management Readiness Level (MgtRL) model is 
recommended. The model integrates the previously researched tools, 
techniques, and analyses with maturity assessments and goals for 
achieving CMMI maturity levels for both the software developer and 
the Government PM organization. 
• Consistent with the use of other TRLs, achieving MgtRL level 6 is 
recommended to reduce the risk of developing the software 
component as a new technology. 
 
Keywords: Software-intensive system acquisition, system acquisition risk 
management, software system management, Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW), 
Architecture Trade-off Analysis Methodology (ATAM), Failure Modes and Effects 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA), MUIRS, Software Engineering Institute (SEI) Capability 
Maturity Model-Integrated (CMMI) for Development (CMMI-DEV) and for Acquisition 
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Executive Summary 
The Department of Defense (DoD) continues to experience both successful 
and unsuccessful software-intensive systems development, despite all of the 
considerable qualifications of the workforce and the significant controls offered by 
the Defense Acquisition System (DAS). The unsuccessful software-intensive 
systems have suffered dramatic cost and schedule overruns, impacting 
modernization timetables and reducing funding for other developmental priorities. 
This research is a continuation and consolidation of previous research 
projects conducted for the U.S. Navy Open Architecture Task Force. That previous 
research is identified and cited where appropriate. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze why DoD risk management 
processes have not been more effective in reducing software-intensive systems 
development risk. This research addresses the use of the Technical Readiness 
Assessment (TRA) using the nine-level software Technology Readiness Levels 
(TRLs), use of the software developer maturity level assessments using the 
Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI’s) Capability Maturity Model-Integrated for 
Development (CMMI-DEV), and use of the software acquirer maturity level 
assessments using SEI’s CMMI for Acquisition (CMMI-ACQ). The recommendations 
include the use of effective tools, techniques, and analyses presented in the author’s 
previous research efforts. 
The previously researched tools, techniques, and analyses include the SEI’s 
Quality Attribution Workshop (QAW), the MUIRS (maintainability, upgradability, 
interoperability, reliability, and safety/security) analysis methodology, SEI’s 
Architectural Tradeoff Analysis Methodologysm (ATAMsm), Logistics Supportability 
Analysis (LSA), and the Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA).  
The major research findings include the following: 
• The software TRLs are ineffective in reducing technical risk for the 
software component development. 
• Without the software TRLs, there is no effective method to perform 
software TRA or reduce the technical development risk. The software 
component will behave as a new, untried technology in nearly every 
software-intensive weapon system development. 
• Given that the software technical risk cannot be effectively managed, 
risk reduction is focused on reducing management risk for both the 
supplier (contractor) and the acquirer (government PM organization). 
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• Assessing organizational maturity as a risk-reducing approach, 
industry appears to be gaining excellent results through moving up the 
SEI CMMI-DEV maturity levels. There seems to be little DoD interest in 
using the SEI CMMI-ACQ for assessing or improving the PM 
organization maturity. 
The major research recommendations include the following: 
• Shift the software development risk management focus from technical 
to managerial risk reduction. 
• A nine-level software Management Readiness Level (MgtRL) model is 
recommended. The model integrates the previously researched tools, 
techniques, and analyses with maturity assessments and goals for 
achieving CMMI maturity levels for both the software developer and 
the government PM organization. 
• Consistent with the use of other TRLs, achieving MgtRL level 6 is 
recommended to reduce the risk of developing the software 
component as a new technology. 
 
Keywords: Software-intensive system acquisition, system acquisition risk 
management, software system management, Quality Attribute Workshop (QAW), 
Architecture Trade-off Analysis Methodology (ATAM), Failure Modes and Effects 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA), MUIRS, Software Engineering Institute (SEI) Capability 
Maturity Model-Integrated (CMMI) for Development (CMMI-DEV) and for Acquisition 
(CMMI-ACQ), DoD Acquisition System. 
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Introduction 
Acquisition of needed capabilities is challenging because acquirers 
have overall accountability for satisfying the end user while allowing 
the supplier to perform the tasks necessary to develop and provide the 
solution. … Unfortunately, many organizations have not invested in the 
capabilities necessary to effectively manage projects in an acquisition 
environment. Too often acquirers disengage from the project once the 
supplier is hired. Too late they discover that the project is not on 
schedule, deadlines will not be met, the technology selected is not 
viable, and the project has failed. (SEI, 2010b, p. 3) 
This research is the latest in a series of research products focused on 
improving the DoD software-intensive system acquisition. Previous research 
addressed numerous tools, techniques, and analyses designed to improve the 
system development process. All of the research follows a common theme: reducing 
risk in developing DoD software-intensive systems. This research follows that same 
theme. 
As this is a continuation of previous research, there are concepts referenced 
here from those other efforts. The following concepts will not be completely repeated 
in this research but do play an important role in the recommendations:  
• DoD Requirements Generation: “The DoD acquisition environment 
features a requirements flow-down process that involves user-stated 
capabilities-based requirements translated to performance-based 
requirements, then translated to the detailed design specifications” 
(Naegle, 2014, p. 10). The translation process between capbilities-
based to performance-based, and finally to detailed specifications 
provides opportunities for misinterpreted, vaguely stated, weakly 
articulated requirements, and for completely missing requirements as 
well. 
• The Defense Acquisition System (DAS): “The DoD acquisition 
environment appears to remain vulnerable to significant variability 
when developing software-intensive systems, similar to the problems 
currently plaguing the F-35 JSF program. Although the new phases 
and milestones models address the software component development, 
other critical management functions remain unchanged. Requirements 
generation, performance specification development, RFP, source 
selection, and contracting processes have yet to adapt to the unique 
challenges presented when managing software-intensive system 
development” (Naegle, 2014, p. 10). 
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• The Software Engineering Environment: There is significant evidence for 
software engineering immaturity, and it is nearly impossible to find widely 
accepted, industry-wide development standards, protocols, 
architectures, or formats. There are no dominant programming 
languages, design and development processes, standard architectures, 
or software engineering tools, which means that reusable modules and 
components rapidly become obsolete. All of these combine to make it 
nearly impossible to institute a widely accepted software reuse 
repository. Without significant software architecture and code reuse in 
developing software-intensive weapon systems, each development 
process essentially starts from scratch. This fact is one of the main 
reasons that the technology readiness assessment (TRA) and the 
software technology readiness levels (TRLs) are ineffective in predicting 
software development risk (Naegle & Petross, 2007). The software 
engineering state-of-the-practice currently is wholly dependent on the 
requirements that are passed to the software development team. From 
the requirements, a software architecture is designed, and the 
requirements “flow down” through that architecture to the individual 
modules and computer software units that are to be constructed. The 
software build focuses on the requirements that flowed down to that level 
and the integration required for functionality. The standards, protocols, 
formats, languages, and tools used for the build will likely be unique to 
the contractor developing the software and will most certainly not be 
universally accepted or recognized across the software industry (Naegle, 
2014, pp. 11–12). 
• Tools, Techniques, and Processes:   
o The Software Engineering Institute’s Quality Attribute Workshop 
(QAW): “The QAW is primarily a method for more fully developing 
system software requirements and is intended to provide 
stakeholders input about their needs and expectations from the 
software As the system requirements are developed, software 
quality attributes are identified and become the basis for 
designing the software architecture.” (Barbacci et al., 2003, p. 1).  
“The QAW process is primarily designed to more fully develop 
system software requirements so that the Government RFP is 
clearer to potential contractors. In turn, the resulting proposals 
should be more accurate and realistic, reducing requirements and 
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o The Maintainability, Upgradability, Interoperability, Reliability, & 
Safety and Security (MUIRS) analytic technique: “The MUIRS 
analytic technique is designed to provide a framework for better 
understanding of essential supportability and safety/security 
aspects that the warfighter needs and expects but often doesn’t 
communicate clearly with the capabilities-based JCIDS 
documents. This analytic technique helps compensate for the 
immature software engineering environment as the MUIRS 
analysis illuminates the derived and implied requirements that the 
immature environment cannot. With its capabilities and 
performance based requirements processes, the DoD significantly 
depends on mature engineering environments to fill the gaps left 
from the requirements generation and communication processes, 
but the software engineering environment is unable to do so. The 
MUIRS analysis is also an enabler for the QAW and Architectural 
Tradeoff Analysis Methodology (ATAMsm).” (Naegle, 2014, pp. 
24–25). 
o The Software Engineering Institute’s (ATAMsm): The SEI’s 
ATAMsm is an architectural analysis tool designed to evaluate 
design decisions based on the quality attribute requirements of 
the system being developed. The methodology is a process for 
determining whether the quality attributes are achievable by the 
architecture, because it has been conceived before enormous 
resources have been committed to that design. One of the main 
goals is to gain insight into how the quality attributes trade-off 
against each other (Kazman, Klein, & Clements, 2000, p. 1). “The 
ATAM process addresses four primary problem areas: 
 The scenario development provides much more 
operational context than the typical OMS/MP provides. 
This level of detail helps to compensate for the immature 
software engineering environment and is critical for the 
proper design of the software architecture.  
The ATAM serves as a very effective software design 
metric function. With the software development team using 
50% or more of the available resources for requirements 
analysis and software design before the Preliminary 
Design Review (PDR), it is critical to have an effective 
software design metrics function. Traditional software 
design metrics focus on the design complexity and do not 
address whether the design is adequate or not. ATAM 
directly links the user requirements to the system 
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architectural design. 
 As the testing program is developed from the scenarios, it 
becomes difficult to omit any critical testing event. In 
addition, the software developer understands the tests or 
verification events that must be passed for user 
acceptance. 
 By integrating the MUIRS analyses into the ATAM scenario 
development, sustainability and safety/security aspects 
cannot easily be omitted from the system design. As the 
testing plan flows from the scenarios, the MUIRS design 
elements will have corresponding test or verification events 
identified in the test plan.” (Naegle, 2014, pp. 27–28) 
o The Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA): “As 
the title indicates, this analysis methodology is designed to 
identify system failure modes and those failures’ effects on the 
system, and ascertain the relative criticality of that type of failure. 
The primary problem areas addressed by FMECA include 
requirements clarification and prioritization, and helping to ensure 
a sound software architecture design. This analysis also ensures 
that the most critical software systems are designed with the 
requisite reliability and will continue to function in degraded 
modes. As previously stated, one of the main functions of 
performing FMECA is to identify those software functions that are 
not critical, and ensuring that failures or anomalies in those non-
critical functions do not preclude or negatively affect system 
capabilities. Today’s systems typically have numerous enhancing 
functions that improve performance but are not critical and the 
software developers have no way to discern the difference 
between a critical system and an enhancing one without 
employing FMECA.” (Naegle, 2014, pp. 28–29) 
This research focuses on risk-reducing techniques including software TRA, 
the resulting TRLs, software developer “maturity,” and DoD Program Management 
Office (PMO) “maturity.” TRLs and developer maturity have long been 
methodologies used to reduce the developmental risk in software-intensive systems. 
Of course, there has been much researched and written regarding DoD 
system development risk reduction in general, and the DoD has a very good model 
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DoD Risk Management Process 
 
Figure 1. DoD Risk Management Process (DAU, 2015, p. 1) 
 
Some of the very latest DoD guidance reiterates the absolute need for 
effective risk management, and the Better Buying Power 3.0 implementation 
memorandum states that  
successful product development requires understanding and actively 
managing program risks. Risk management is an endeavor that begins 
with requirements formulation and assessment, includes the planning 
and conducting of a technical risk reduction phase if needed, and 
strongly influences the structure of the development and test activities. 
Active risk management requires investment based on identification of 
where to best deploy scarce resources. (Under Secretary of Defense 
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 2015, p.2 ) 
Part of the risk management for system development includes assessing the 
readiness of the key technologies for development through a TRA. The DoD’s 
Technology Readiness Assessment Guide describes the basic concept of 
technology risk identification: 
Technology risk identification should start well before the formal TRA 
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the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase, which precedes MS A. An 
early evaluation of technology maturity, conducted shortly after MS A, 
may be helpful to refine further the potential critical technologies to be 
assessed. It may be appropriate to include high-leverage and/or high-
impact manufacturing technologies and life-cycle-related technologies 
if there are questions of maturity and risk associated with those 
technologies. (DoD, 2011, p. 2-6) 
A TRA is required for most Major DoD Acquisition Programs (MDAPs; DoD, 
2011, p. 1-1). The purpose for conducting a TRA is to address the risk of attempting 
to develop a system with a key technology that is too immature to successfully 
deploy the system when needed by the warfighter. To benchmark the assessment, 
TRLs have been developed in a nine-level model.The point of the TRA is to identify 
a system’s key technologies, assess the developmental risk associated with those 
technologies, and assign an appropriate TRL. TRLs are divided into nine levels, as 
depicted in Figure 2. The higher the TRL number achieved, the lower the risk in 
successfully developing a system using that technology. Typically, TRL 6 or 7 
technologies are the highest risk that PMs are likely to accept. However, lower 
technolgy readiness levels have been included in Programs of Record (PORs). As 
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TRL Definitions, Descriptions, and Supporting Information (Continued) 
 
Table 1. TRL Definitions, Descriptions, and Supporting Information  
(DoD, 2011, pp. 2-13–2-14) 
 
DoD TRLs specifically developed for software technologies are presented in 
Table 2, alongside the general TRLs previously presented. 
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Table 2. DoD Definitions of Technology Readiness Levels for Hardware and Software 
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Following the same logic of reducing risk to acceptable levels, the system 
software would have to achieve level 6 or more preferrably, level 7 before integrating 
the software technology into a system under development. As Table 2 states, level 6 
is the “level at which the engineering feasibility of a software technology is 
demonstrated. This level extends to laboratory prototype implementations on full-
scale realistic problems in which the software technology is partially integrated with 
existing hardware/software systems” (Blanchette, Albert, & Garcia-Miller, 2010, p.9 ). 
At level 7, the software readiness would be at the “level at which the program 
feasibility of a software technology is demonstrated. This level extends to 
operational environment prototype implementations, where critical technical risk 
functionality is available for demonstration and a test in which the software 
technology is well integrated with operational hardware/software” (Blanchette, Albert, 
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Assessing Maturity and Risk Reduction 
The SEI [Software Engineering Institute] has taken the process 
management premise, “the quality of a system or product is highly 
influenced by the quality of the process used to develop and maintain 
it,” and defined CMMs [Capability Maturity Models] that embody this 
premise. (SEI, 2010b, p. 5) 
 The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) has been a leader in defining 
organization and process maturity for developing successful software components. 
The go on to explain: “CMMs focus on improving processes in an organization. They 
contain the essential elements of effective processes for one or more disciplines and 
describe an evolutionary improvement path from ad hoc, immature processes to 
disciplined, mature processes with improved quality and effectiveness” (SEI, 2010b, 
p. 5). 
 One of the primary purposes for assessing the software developer’s maturity 
is to reduce the development risk. The relationship between the CMMI maturity 
levels to system development risk is fairly straight forward and is reflected in Figure 
2. 
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As depicted in Figure 2, as each higher maturity level is achieved, overall risk and 
waste is reduced, and for the DoD, acceptable levels of risk reduction have occurred 
at level 3.  
Considering maturity and risk from the software-intensive system acquirer’s 
functions, the SEI has also developed the CMMI for Acquisition (CMMI-ACQ; CMMI, 
2010).  
Now, more than ever, organizations are increasingly becoming 
acquirers of needed capabilities by obtaining products and services 
from suppliers and developing less and less of these capabilities in-
house. This widely adopted business strategy is designed to improve 
an organization’s operational efficiencies by leveraging suppliers’ 
capabilities to deliver quality solutions rapidly, at lower cost, and with 
the most appropriate technology. (CMMI, 2010, p. 3)  
This model accurately describes how the DoD overwhelmingly acquires software-
intensive weapon systems.  
Similar to the other Capability Maturity Models, the CMMI-ACQ uses a five-
level scale as depicted in Table 3. 
Level Focus Key Process Areas 
5 Optimizing Continuous process improvement, Quantitative Acquisition 
Management, Continuous Process Improvement, Organizational 
Performance Improvement 
4 Quantitative Quantitative management, Quantitative Acquisition Management, 
Quantitative Process Management, Statistical Process Control 
3 Defined Process standardization, Integrated Project Management,  
Acquisition Technical Management, User Requirements 
Satisfaction is Defined and Verified, Standard Processes, 
Proactive Process Management and Detailed Process Measures 
2 Managed Institutionalized Project Management and Acquisition 
Engineering, Transition to Support Evaluation, Requirements 
Development and Management, Configuration Management, 
Product and Process Quality Assurance, Process Metrics, 
Acquisition Team Training 
1 Initial Competent people and heroics, Over Commitment, Abandoned 
Processes 
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The same concept of reducing risk as the maturity level increases applies to 
the CMMI-ACQ. Currently, there is no DoD requirement for any program 
management office to achieve a specified level of CMMI-ACQ maturity, leaving that 
decision to the individual organization. There are certain requirements to achieve the 
“competent” portion of Level 1, including educational and training certifications for 
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The DoD Software-Intensive Risk Management 
Problem and Research Technique 
Problem 
As this research is the latest in a series of research on the subject, the 
overarching problem statement remains the same. From a systems management 
perspective, the problem is that the DoD Acquisition Management System produces 
both successful and unsuccessful software-intensive systems. The management 
oversight, structure, and discipline offered do not produce repeatable success in 
complex, software-intensive systems development.  
This research focuses primarily on risk management approaches in software 
intensive systems. Software Technology Readiness Levels (SwTRL), software 
producer maturity levels, and PMO maturity levels are addressed. 
Primary Research Question 
The problem identified above drives this primary research question: Why do 
the DoD Acquisition Management System risk management processes produce both 
successful and unsuccessful software-intensive systems? 
Secondary Research Questions 
I analyze the DoD software-intensive system development challenge by 
addressing these secondary research questions: 
• How effective are the DoD software TRLs in reducing the software 
development risks? 
• What are the anticipated benefits of the software contractor’s achieving 
higher levels of maturity through the CMMI? 
• Could the DoD benefit from requiring its own software-intensive system 
program management offices to achieve higher levels of maturity 
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Software Technology Readiness Level Analysis 
To date, efforts by the Services to interpret the DoD software TRLs 
have been restrained by the requirement to retain the basic definitions 
when creating guidance. Though marginally useful, these efforts have 
only confirmed for the participants the futility of continuing to base 
readiness decisions for software aspects of systems on the DoD 
software TRLs. (Blanchette, Albert, & Garcia-Miller, 2010, p. 2) 
As the quote above suggests, there is significant frustration with using the 
software TRLs in the same fashion that hardware-related TRLs are used to reduce 
the developmental risks. This section of the research provides analyses regarding 
the software TRLs. 
Reviewing the SwTRLs presented earlier, achieving level 7 would be the 
desired software state before initiating a Program Of Record (POR). At the SwTRL 
level 7, the description reads,  
Level at which the program feasibility of a software technology is 
demonstrated. This level extends to operational environment prototype 
implementations, where critical technical risk functionality is available 
for demonstration and a test in which the software technology is well 
integrated with operational hardware/software. (Blanchette, Albert, & 
Garcia-Miller, 2010, pp. 33–36)   
This clearly suggests that the actual software that would be used on a 
proposed system already exists and has been tested in the relevant environments.  
In the overwhelming majority of cases, there simply is no reusable software in 
existence that could satisfy the TRL objectives. As I have documented in my 
previous research, the software engineering environment is not mature. There are 
no widely accepted, industry-wide standards for software languages, formats, 
architectures, tools or protocols (Naegle,2014). Without these, there cannot be 
useful repositories of reusable software, ready to be inserted into the architecture of 
proposed weapon systems. This fact is one of the sources for the frustration echoed 
in the quotation provided at the beginning of this section.  
So what can be used as a SwTRL surrogate for the nonexistent software? 
Most times, a recent, similar system is used to estimate the technolgy readiness of 
the software in the proposed system. The premise is that the existing system’s 
architecture, complexity, and functions are similar enough to fairly accurately predict 
the software development resources required for the new system. Unfortunately, this 
technique has proven to be ineffective as evidenced by the F-22 Raptor 
development and the follow-on F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) effort. The two high-
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similar, and are both developed by the same contractor. The F-22 would seem to be 
a very good predictor of the F-35 software development effort with the SwTRL 
model, but it clearly was not: 
The lines of code necessary for the JSF’s capabilities have now grown to over 
24 million—9.5 million on board the aircraft. By comparison, JSF has about 3 
times more on-board software lines of code than the F-22A Raptor and 6 times 
more than the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet. This has added work and increased 
the overall complexity of the effort. The software on-board the aircraft and 
needed for operations has grown 37 percent since the critical design review in 
2005. … Almost half of the on-board software has yet to complete integration 
and test – typically the most challenging phase of software development. 
(GAO, 2012, p. 11) 
The report goes on to state that typical software size growth in DoD systems 
development ranges from 30% to 100%.  
JSF design changes were originally supposed to taper off and be completed 
by January 2014. Actual design changes through September 2011 failed to taper off 
and continue at a significantly high rate. The projections in the GAO (2012) report 
indicated that the revised design change projections would continue and actually 
grow in number, until January 2019 (p. 16). Given this level of redesign, the software 
and system complexity growth are likely to continue.  
In addition to the software growth problems experienced in the F-35, software 
architecture and performance problems indicate that the use of F-22 SwTRLs was 
inneffective. The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), Michael 
Gilmore, has assessed the software demonstrations on the F-35 Program: 
 “DOT&E Gilmore’s Verdict on F-35 Software Demonstrations 
• Block 2F for Marine Corps F-35B IOC in 2015 delivered with “hundreds of 
deficiencies” 
• Block 3i for Air Force F-35-A IOC in 2016 “problematic,” and performing 
poorly in development test 
• Block 3F to complete F-35 system development in 2017 “demonstrating poor 
performance” 
• Block 4, first post-service-entry upgrade, too aggressive and under-
resourced” (Sweetman, 2016, p. 1) 
 
 
The DOT&E findings and the amount of software growth in the lines of code 
experienced by the F-35 program are certainly indicators that using the F-22 as a 
surrogate for assessing software technology readiness was not effective in this case. 
Considering how similar these two systems are and the fact that they are 
manufactured by the same contractor, the validity of using this approach is 
questionable at best. 
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Software Technology Readiness Conclusion 
Addressing the research question, how effective are the DoD software TRLs 
in reducing the software development risks? 
Software TRLs are significantly ineffective in reducing software 
developmental risk in DoD weapons system development. The actual system 
software is overwhelmingly unavailable to perform the software TRL analysis, since 
it has not been built when the assessment needs to be made. Using a like system as 
a surrogate for the assessment appears to be highly unreliable, as well. 
Considering how much system functionality is dependent on software, a 
system TRA is significantly impacted by not having a reliable software TRL as part of 
the assessment. This increases the developmental risk exponentially. 
With no viable alternative for software TRLs, DoD software-intensive weapon 
system development must proceed with a key technology, software, which must be 
managed as a new, immature technology in nearly every case. 
Capability Maturity Model Risk Reduction Analysis 
CMMI: Major Benefits to DoD. “Does CMMI work?” We asked our 
nation’s defense contractors, as well as governement agencies, to share 
results from their performance improvement efforts using CMMI. The 
results spoke for themselves: “Yes, CMI works!” (SEI, 2010a, p. 5) 
The above quote is from a Software Engineering Institute report titled Benefits 
of CMMI Within the Defense Industry. This report documents both quantitative and 
qualitative improvements by defense contractors that have achieved higher levels of 
CMMI Development (CMMI-DEV) maturity. The results reported are dramatic 
improvements in nearly every category examined including 
• 6.35 times less defect discovery and repair hours after start of system 
testing; potential savings of 5–6.5 months in schedule delay after 
systems tests begin for average sized project (p. 7) 
• 105.3 fewer hours per defect. 88.6 fewer hours during testing alone (p. 
9) 
• Percent of defects removed prior to system test: > 85% 
• Cost savings to customer in a cost-plus contract: Rose from 5.7 million 
to 7.1 million (25%; p. 15) 
• Organization 2a reported their quantified ROI from CMMI Maturity 
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• Many qualitative benefits reported, including products with lower levels 
of defects and lower risk; improved program insight, control, and 
tracking; and personnel retention and job satisfaction. (Benefits of SEI, 
2010a) 
It is abundantly clear that moving up the CMMI maturity scale has positive, 
tangible results for defense contractors and by extension, the DoD entities 
contracting with them. If the return on investment published is realizable, there is 
ample incentive for the DoD industry partners to achieve and maintain higher levels 
of CMMI maturity, as the return on investment is extremely significant. 
SEI has developed a model for assessing the maturity of the acquiring 
organizations called Capability Maturity Model Integrated for Acquisition (CMMI-
ACQ). The basic concept is that the software-intensive system acquiring 
organizations are as important to the success of the development as the developing 
organizations. The system requirements development and communication is the 
purview of the acquiring organization and is obviously critical to the development 
process. If you had the best developer in the world and provided that developer with 
incomplete or wrong requirements, you could end up with a perfectly 
developed,wrong system, which is still a system failure as far as the user is 
concerned. The SEI CMMI-ACQ used the depiction shown in Figure 3 to illustrate 
the concept. 
 





 No Product 
 Mismatch 
Mature acquirer mentors 
low maturity supplier 
 Outcome not    
 predictable 
Mismatch 
Less mature acquirer derails mature 
supplier; encourages shortcuts 
 Supplier Compromises 
 Processes 
Matched 
Acquirer and supplier are both high 
maturity 
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So what are the benefits to the DoD for moving up the CMMI-ACQ maturity 
levels? Brettle (2012) wrote,  
I recently worked with a client on their implementation of CMMI-ACQ. 
After much hard work and courage, they were rated as a maturity level 
2 organisation late last year. Along the way, they accumulated many 
better practices, benefits and a better understanding of how their own 
organisation needs to work with partners and suppliers. So after this 
success, I was curious to know which other organisations had gone 
down the CMMI-ACQ path and published their appraisal results. I was 
well and truly shocked to see the numbers from the SEI’s PARS 
[published appraisal report system] displayed on my laptop. In the past 
3 years, only 10 organisations globally have invested in CMMI-ACQ to 
improve their acquisisition of products and services to achieve a 
maturity level rating of 2 or greater, whilst CMMI-DEV [CMMI for 
Development] is into the thousands.” (p. 1) 
As of the writing of this research, the CMMI PARS reports a total of 11 
organizations globally with published appraisal reports during the period 2013 
through 2015. There was only one U.S.-based contractor, Northrup Grumman 
Technical Services, in the report, and no U.S. government offices were listed. Of 
course, this does not mean that none participated or used the CMMI-ACQ for 
internal evaluation, just that none appear in the published record (SEI, 2016). 
It appears that the use of the CMMI-ACQ is not widespread within the DoD, 
either. Searching for DoD organizations that had undergone and recorded any type 
of CMMI-ACQ evaluation drew scant results. There was one SEI presentation that 
indicated that at least one DoD entity, which remained unnamed, had been an early 
adopter of the CMMI-ACQ in 2008 (Gross & Fisher, 2008, p. 30). 
One of the reasons that the DoD has not embraced the use of CMMI-ACQ 
may have to do with the extensive training and education requirements of the 
acquisition workforce under the direction of the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA). The DoD established the Defense Acquisition University 
(DAU) to set the training and certification process for the workforce, and the DAU 
has prescribed the training requirements for individuals and designated positions 
within the acquisition community.  
Another reason that the DoD may not embrace the CMMI-ACQ 
methodologies is that the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) certainly appears to 
provide ample control mechanisms for the developmental process. The numerous 
technical reviews, audits, and baselines used to ensure the Systems Engineering 
Process (SEP), combined with the mandatory reporting requirements for the phases 
and milestones would at least appear to provide an effective environment for 
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successful and unsuccessful software-intensive systems, indicating that the DAS is 
not always effective with software-intensive systems development.  
Capability Maturity Model Risk Reduction Conclusion 
Addressing the research question, what are the anticipated benefits of the 
software contractor’s achieving higher levels of maturity through the CMMI? 
On the industry side, the advantages of achieving higher CMMI-DEV maturity 
levels at least appear to be significant and the positive impacts to the development 
cycle were dramatic, which provides ample incentive for the DoD’s industry partners 
to invest in the CMMI process improvements. In short, the CMMI-DEV maturity helps 
them achieve what they must, profitability. DoD entities contracting with those that 
have achieved higher maturity levels would also benefit from that maturity. 
Addressing the research question, could the DoD benefit from requiring its 
own software-intensive system program management offices to achieve higher 
levels of maturity through the CMMI-ACQ? 
On the DoD side, there does not appear to be much interest in moving up the 
CMMI-ACQ maturity scale, or in even doing those type of assessments. There, of 
course, are significant individual qualifications that must be met for the members of 
the DoD PM team and others that are specific to acquisition positions, as prescribed 
by the DAU. 
The CMMI-ACQ would provide an assessment of the maturity of the PM 
organization instead of reliance on the individual expertise of each individual within 
it. Even at CMMI-ACQ level 1, competent people are recognized, but the other 
processes tend to be ad hoc. This enables the acquirer/supplier mismatch presented 
earlier, setting up the DoD as the less mature acquirer that derails the mature 
supplier, compromising the entire process. 
Overall Research Conclusion 
Addressing the primary research question, why do the DoD Acquisition 
Management System risk management processes produce both successful and 
unsuccessful software-intensive systems? 
There appear to be several root causes for why DoD risk management is 
producing both successful and unsuccessful software-intensive systems.  
• Most weapon system software is engineered and built from scratch. 
This happens because the DoD is interested in developing cutting-
edge technology systems, and must understand all of the software in-
depth to know what cyber security vulnerabilities might exist. The 
immature software engineering environment makes it nearly  
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impossible to reuse software components that have been successful in 
past applications. 
• “Due in large part to the immature software engineering environment, 
each major DoD software design and build tends to be unique. That 
means that the software development in complex systems will act the 
same way as integrating a new technology would, and the resulting 
program risk is very high. The software TRLs have little meaning in this 
type of environment, so risk management is highly dependent on the 
Government and software development teams’ abilities to manage the 
system software development as a new technology with a low TRL.” 
(Naegle, 2014, p. 31) 
• The TRA using software TRLs is not effective. This leaves software-
intensive system technical risk very high for the software component. 
Essentially, this means each software-intensive system is forced to 
manage the software development as a new, untried, unproven 
technology build. In other words, an extremely low software TRL is 
where they must begin. 
• The difference between success and failure in the software-intensive 
system development is likely to be how effectively the PM organization 
can apply the DAS process controls, and augment them with other 
tools, techniques and analyses that improve effectiveness. In this 
situation, where there is little opportunity to manage risk through 
technology maturation, the success of the project is dependent on the 
effectiveness of the processes and the skill of the PM organizations for 
both the contractor and the government. The DoD’s focus on the 
individual competence and the existing DAS controls available appears 
to overlook the impact of the organizational effectiveness.   
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 The recommendations are designed to address improving software-intensive 
system development risk reduction in an environment where the software technical 
risk cannot practically be assessed or managed. Under these circumstances, the 
software development must be managed as a new, immature technology by the PM 
organization. 
The following recommendations represent an integrated approach to address 
the problems presented in all of the associated research efforts. Addressing problem 
areas within the complex DoD Acquisition System and adding the dynamics of the 
human component means that recommendations are necessarily complex. Adding 
to that complexity is the fact that the DAS produces successful software-intensive 
programs in addition to the unsuccessful efforts. This means that the existing system 
with its control measures, organizations, and professional workforce can produce a 
successful program, but does not always do so. 
The integrated approach includes the other research conclusions and 
recommendations. The research conducted earlier was not wholly included in this 
paper, for brevity. 
Software-Intensive System Development Risk Reduction 
With no viable means of reducing the software development technical risk, 
the focus turns to the acquiring organization’s ability to effectively lead and manage 
the development of the system software as a new, critical technology. To focus on 
the organization as a whole, I recommend management readiness assessments 
using Management Readiness Levels (MgtRLs) similar to the TRLs used for key 
technologies. To be consistent, I offer nine MgtRL levels with a goal of achieving 
level 6 or 7 before risk is sufficiently reduced to proceed with the program. 
I introduced a very basic version of the MgtRLs in my previous research effort 
and expand on those here (Naegle, 2014). The MgtRL approach I use is to combine 
CMMI maturity with the use of tools, techniques, and analyses previously 
researched to improve the processes within the DAS. As both the acquirer 
(government PM) and the supplier (contractor) are critical to the success of a 
software-intensive system development, supplier maturity is included. 
• Level 1: PM team and software developers (contractors) meet all 
professional certifications and adhere to DoD policy for achieving maturity 
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• Level 2: PM team has fully developed derived and implied requirements 
using a QAW or similar approach, and RFP performance specification 
reflects the total inventory of discoverable requirements. The evaluation 
includes a MUIRS analysis for sustainability, safety, and cyber security 
requirements assessment. PM team conducts internal CMMI-ACQ 
maturity evaluation.  
• Level 3: PM team has conducted a self-evaluation and meets the CMMI-
ACQ level 2 criteria. Software developer has achieved CMMI-DEV level 2 
in an external evaluation.  
• Level 4: User representatives agree to use ATAMsm; the PM team has 
conducted at least one iteration of ATAM before RFP release. ATAM 
development includes MUIRS and FMECA scenarios. 
• Level 5: PM team conducts pre and post contract award ATAM iterations, 
and continues ATAM through the initial program design reviews. 
• Level 6: PM team has achieved CMMI-ACQ level 2 in an externally 
conducted evaluation. Software developer has achieved level 3 (or higher) 
in an externally conducted CMMI-DEV evaluation.  
• Level 7: PM team has achieved CMMI-ACQ level 3 in an externally 
conducted SA-CMM evaluation. Software developer has achieved level 4 
in an externally conducted CMMI-DEV evaluation.  
• Level 8: PM team has achieved CMMI-ACQ level 4 in an externally 
conducted evaluation. Software developer has achieved level 5 in an 
externally conducted CMMI-DEV evaluation.  
• Level 9: PM team has achieved CMMI-ACQ level 5 in an externally 
conducted evaluation.  
Preparing and executing CMMI-ACQ evaluations, especially those performed 
by external entities, certainly adds to the burden on a PM organization, but the return 
on investment for achieving higher levels of acquirer maturity would likely justify the 
resources invested. The tools, techniques, and analyses suggested augment the 
DAS technical development control mechanisms, focusing on those elements most 
critical to the software development.  
Moving up these suggested MgtRLs, using the proven tools, techniques, 
analyses, and maturity levels, provides a risk-reducing approach to developing the 
software as a new, critical technology. The MgtRLs focus on the organizations and 
include both government and contractor, recognizing the importance of both for 
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